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 Non-technical summary 
 
Private enforcement of competition law is on the rise worldwide and a major item on the EU 
competition policy agenda. The relevant provisions in the EU and the US confer a right to 
damages to “any individual” and “any person” harmed by a cartel. However, while there is 
much research about actions for damages by cartel customers, the question whether and how 
other parties that may incur losses due to a cartel can obtain damages is usually neglected and 
largely open in Europe. This paper analyses the issue with respect to suppliers of a 
downstream cartel from a comparative law and economics perspective. 
First, we show that the losses such cartel suppliers incur are driven by three effects: Cartel 
members lower sales and correspondingly their input demand (direct quantity effect), which 
in turn affects the price suppliers can charge (price effect) and their production costs (cost 
effect). 
We then analyze whether suppliers are entitled to claim these losses as damages in the two 
leading competition law regimes, the US and the EU. We find that, while the majority view in 
the US denies standing, the emerging position in the EU and important member states is to 
grant supplier standing. We argue that the case law in Courage v. Crehan implies that the type 
of loss which the competition provisions are intended to prevent is broader in the EU than in 
the US. In particular, pursuant to EU law, a right to damages does not require that the loss 
suffered occurred in the same market than the lessening of competition that makes the 
defendant’s conduct illegal. As a consequence, both Germany and England have abandoned 
important traditional limitations on standing. We argue that the more generous approach to 
standing in the EU compared to the US can be justified in view of the different institutional 
context and the goals assigned to the right to damages in the EU.  
According to our analysis cartel suppliers in principle have a right to damages in the EU, as 
no general restrictions on standing ought to apply; however, the causation requirement will be 
an important hurdle to clear in a particular case. Sound econometric estimation techniques are 
of major importance to overcome that obstacle. In this respect, we finally present an 
econometric approach based on residual demand estimation that allows to quantify all 
determinants of cartel suppliers’ damages.  
Our results therefore suggest that supplier damage claims are a viable option that can 
contribute to full compensation and greater cartel deterrence in the EU irrespective of further 
controversial collective action mechanisms. 
 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Die private Durchsetzung des Wettbewerbsrechts gewinnt weltweit kontinuierlich an 
Bedeutung und ist ein zentrales Anliegen der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik. Die 
maßgeblichen Vorschriften in der EU und den USA gewähren dem Wortlaut nach 
„jedermann“ bzw. „any person“, der einen Kartellschaden erlitten hat, einen Anspruch auf 
Ersatz. Allerdings konzentrieren sich Forschung und öffentliche Diskussion bisher fast 
ausschließlich auf Klagen von Kartellabnehmern; ob und wie andere mögliche Betroffene 
Ersatz verlangen können, ist demgegenüber kaum untersucht und in Europa weitegehend 
ungeklärt. Das vorliegende Diskussionspapier untersucht die Frage für Zulieferer, welche 
Verluste aufgrund eines nachgelagerten Preiskartells ihrer Abnehmer erleiden, aus 
rechtsökonomischer und rechtsvergleichender Perspektive.  
Wir zeigen zunächst, dass die Einbußen der Zulieferer von drei Effekten bestimmt werden: 
Einem direkten Nachfrageeffekt infolge der verringerten Inputnachfrage der 
Kartellmitglieder, einem dadurch ausgelösten Effekt auf den erzielbaren Verkaufspreis sowie 
einem Kosteneffekt.  
Anschließend untersuchen wir, ob Zulieferer entstehende Einbußen in den USA und der EU, 
den beiden führenden Wettbewerbsrechtsordnungen, als Schadensersatz geltend machen 
können. Während in den USA eine Klagebefugnis überwiegend abgelehnt wird, zeichnet sich 
für das Unionsrecht sowie in wichtigen Mitgliedsstaaten die Ansicht ab, auch Lieferanten ein 
Recht auf Schadensersatz zuzubilligen. Wir legen dar, dass gem. der Rechtsprechung im Fall 
Courage v. Crehan der Kreis der Schäden, welche das Kartellverbot verhindern soll, in der 
EU breiter definiert ist als in den USA. Insbesondere setzt ein Recht auf Schadensersatz nach 
Unionsrecht nicht voraus, dass die erlittenen Verluste in demselben Markt eingetreten sind, 
auf dem das Kartell den Wettbewerb rechtswidrig beeinträchtigt. Um dieser Vorgabe gerecht 
zu werden, haben Deutschland und England wichtige herkömmliche Einschränkungen des 
Rechts auf Kartellschadensersatz aufgegeben. Wir argumentieren, dass sich der großzügigere 
Ansatz des Unionsrechts im Vergleich zu den USA mit Unterschieden im institutionellen 
Kontext und den Zielen begründen lässt, die das Recht auf Schadensersatz in der EU verfolgt. 
Aus den Ergebnissen der Untersuchung folgt, dass Kartellzulieferern in der EU im Grundsatz 
ein Recht auf Schadenersatz zusteht, da insoweit keine allgemeine Beschränkung der 
Ersatzberechtigung eingreift. Allerdings erweist sich in einem konkreten Fall der Nachweis 
eines Kausalzusammenhangs zwischen Kartell und (Zulieferer-)Schaden erfahrungsgemäß als 
wichtige Hürde. Fundierte ökonometrische Schätzverfahren sind von zentraler Bedeutung, um 
 dieses Hindernis zu überwinden. Das Diskussionspapier entwickelt dazu abschließend einen 
Ansatz basierend auf einem modifizierten Residualnachfragemodell, der es ermöglicht, alle 
drei Bestimmungsfaktoren von Zuliefererschäden zu quantifizieren. 
Unsere Ergebnisse sprechend demnach dafür, dass Schadensersatzklagen von 
Kartellzulieferern eine gangbare Möglichkeit sind, um eine möglichst umfassende 
Kompensation von Kartellschäden und eine größere Abschreckung von 
Kartellrechtsverstößen auch ohne zusätzliche umstrittene Mechanismen kollektiver 
Rechtsdurchsetzung zu erreichen. 
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I. Introduction 
Private actions for damages from competition law infringements are on the rise worldwide.
1
 
In Europe, having remained in the shadows for long,
2
 they are at the heart of the legal and 
policy debate since the Court of Justice (ECJ) held in Courage that
3
 
“The full effectiveness (…) and, in particular, the practical effect of (…) Article [101(1) TFEU4] 
would be put at risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to him 
by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition.
5” 
Five years later, the ECJ added in Manfredi that  
“It follows that any individual can claim compensation for the harm suffered where there is a 
causal relationship between that harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article [101 
TFEU
6
].
7
 
The court’s holding that “any individual” has a right to damages strikingly resembles the 
language in Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act
8
 stipulating that 
                                                          
1
  Rubinfeld, in: Elhauge, Research Handbook on the Economics of Antitrust Law, 2012, p. 378. 
2
  Whish/Bailey, Competition Law, 7
th
 ed. 2012, p. 319; Romain/Gubbay, The European Antitrust Review 2011, 
47, 51. This is not to say that private enforcement had been negligible or even inexistent. However, many 
actions did and do relate to other remedies than damages (for Germany see Peyer, 8 J Comp L & Ec 331, esp. 
348 et seqq.; concerning the UK Rodger, 29 E.C.L.R. 96-116). 
3
  On the ground-braking character of this judgment see Italianer, Public and private enforcement of 
competition law, 5
th
 International Competition Conference 17 February 2012, Brussels. 
4
  At the time of the judgment article Article 85(1) EC. 
5
  Case C-453/99 – Courage, [2001] ECR I-6297, para 26. 
6
  At the time of the judgment art. 81 EC. 
7
  Case C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, [2006] ECR I-6619, para 61. 
8
  15 U.S.C. § 15. 
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“(…) any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden 
in the antitrust laws may sue therefor (…) and shall recover threefold the damages (…).” 
However, the US courts have developed important limitations on standing, whereas the ECJ’s 
dicta seem to exclude any restriction besides causality. Nonetheless, so far the European 
private enforcement debate has focused almost exclusively on purchasers,
9
 neglecting the 
numerous other parties that may incur losses from a cartel. In particular, while it is accepted 
that suppliers to a buying cartel are entitled to compensation,
10
 it is mostly overlooked that 
suppliers to “ordinary” sellers’ cartels regularly suffer losses, too. Section 2 explains the 
determinants for their harm. Section 3 analyses the legal standards for supplier standing in the 
two leading competition law regimes, the US and the EU. We show that, while supplier 
standing is mostly denied in the US, in the EU the type of loss which the competition 
provisions are intended to prevent is broader, but the question of supplier standing still 
unsettled. As the EU-law gaps are filled by national legal systems, we exemplify the interplay 
of the ECJ’s case law and the law of the member states by way of outlining the legal 
situations in England and Germany, i.e. one common law and one continental law country. 
Section 4 discusses the case for and against supplier standing in Europe, examining whether 
lessons can be drawn from the US approach. Section 5 complements our findings by showing 
how supplier damages can be estimated econometrically with an adjusted residual demand 
model. Section 6 concludes. 
II. Upstream cartel damages in a vertical production chain  
1. Graphical analysis 
A competition law infringement can be expected to cause, as the US Supreme Court has put 
it, ripples of harm to flow through the economy,
11
 especially if it occurs in a vertical 
production chain. A cartel in one layer produces numerous effects in the layers up- and 
                                                          
9
  Particular attention has been devoted to the passing on defence, see e.g. Commission Staff working 
accompanying the White Paper on Damage actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, 2.4.2008, SEC(2008) 
404, p. 62-69 and recently the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, COM(2013) 404 final, p. 17 et seq, and art. 12-
15; Nebbia, 33 E.L.Rev. 23, 36-39 (2008); with respect to German, English and Dutch law Maton et al., 2 J 
of Eur Comp L & Practice, 489, 491, 500, 506 (2011); summary from eleven jurisdictions International 
Competition Network Cartels Working Group, Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement in Cartels 
Cases, Report to the ICN annual conference, Moscow, May 2007, p. 11-13; mainly with respect to German 
law Wurmnest, 6 German L. J. 1173, 1182 et seqq. (2005). For economic perspectives on the quantification 
of purchaser damages and the role of a passing-on defense see, e.g., Hellwig, Private Damage Claims and the 
Passing-On Defense in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases: An Economist’s Perspective, Reprints of the Max 
Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn 2006/22 (2006); Verboven/Van Dijk, J of Ind Econ, 
57(3), pp. 457-491 (2009). For general recent overviews about damages estimation techniques in particular 
for downstream damages see Rubinfeld, in: Elhauge (fn. 1), p. 378, 379-391; de Coninck, Concurrences 1-
2010, 39-43. 
10
  See for the US Areeda/Hovenkamp, Antitrust law, Vol. IIA, 3
rd
. ed. 2007, ¶ 350 p. 234 et seq. (majority view 
of the US-courts, however with occasional aberrant judgments); for European Competition law cf. the recent 
proposal for a damages directive (fn. 9), COM(2013 404 final, p. 16, and generally on the illegality of buying 
cartels Ezrachi, 8 J of Competition Law and Economics 47, 55 et seqq.; Elhauge/Geradin, Global 
Competition Law and Economics, 2
nd
 ed. 2011, p. 249 et seqq. (for US, EU and other nations); for German 
Law Bornkamm, in: Langen/Bunte, GWB, 11
th
 Ed. 2010, § 33, Rn. 36; Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, 
GWB, 4th. Ed. 2007, § 33, Rn. 28; for English law cf. Brealey/Green, Competition Litigation, 2010, para 
2.02. 
11
  Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534, 103 SCt. 897, 
907. 
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downstream.
12
 Direct purchasers pay higher input prices (overcharge) and, by consequence, 
generally lower their demand. Hence, the cartel members have to balance the positive effect 
on their profits from a higher selling price with the negative effect from a lower sales volume, 
which prompts them to reduce their production and – correspondingly – their input demand. 
As a consequence, direct suppliers to a sellers’ cartel13 sell less, too. The input reductions 
percolate through the upstream layers, so that the sales of indirect cartel suppliers fall as well.  
To illustrate the determinants of supplier damages, assume a monopolist that produces with 
increasing marginal costs MC(x) and sells his product to a number of downstream firms. For 
simplicity, let the monopolist’s selling price equal the downstream firms’ input costs14 (Figure 
1).  
At the outset, the firms downstream the monopoly layer compete. The monopolist confronts 
the downward sloping linear inverse demand function p(x)
*
 and the marginal revenue function 
MR(x)
*
. Maximising his profits, he sells in equilibrium quantity x
*
 at price p
*
. 
 
 
Figure 1: Damages suffered by a direct cartel supplier
15
 
If the monopolist’s customers start to collude on their product market, i.e. jointly maximise 
their profits, they charge a higher price and sell less of their output.16 The supplier monopolist 
faces an ensuing fall in demand, that turns his inverse demand curve inward and yields the 
function  ̃   .17 The monopolist’s new optimum,  ̃ and  ̃, is characterized by lower demand, 
                                                          
12
  Besides, a cartel might also influence neighbouring layers, e.g. through umbrella effects.  
13
  This scenario has to be distinguished from a – comparably rare – buyers’ cartel in which cartel members use 
their market power on the demand side to force down the input price. 
14
  This abstracts from additional costs for other inputs necessary to process the product, such as electricity or 
labour. This simplifies the analysis, however does not change the fundamental results. 
15  This figure is similar to Han et. al (2009) who illustrate the case of an “undercharge” in a model with 
numerous layers up- and downstream the cartel stage. See Han, M. A., .Schinkel, M. P and Tuinstra, J., The 
Overcharge as a Measure for Antitrust Damages, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper 8, 
2009, p. 25. 
16
  Downstream the cartel, there may be only one layer of cartel purchasers or several layers with direct and 
indirect purchasers. We do not specify the situation downstream the cartel but concentrate on the damages 
suffered by a direct cartel supplier. 
17
  Note that the inverse demand function does not shift, but turns inwards in case of a sellers’ cartel, because we 
assume that the cartel members’ maximum willingness to pay for inputs does not change due to collusion. 
Thus, graphically, the intercept of the inverse demand function remains the same. By contrast, a buyers’ 
page 5 of 28 
 
a lower selling price, and lower marginal cost. Accordingly, his losses are determined by three 
effects: 
(1) A direct quantity effect      ̃             due to the cartel members’ lower input 
demand, illustrated by the darkly shaded rectangle between x1 and x2. The effect equals 
the difference between the supplier’s sales volumes under downstream competition and 
collusion, multiplied by his price-cost margin under competition. The direct quantity 
effect is generally negative18 and accounts for the main part of supplier damages. 
(2) A price effect      ̃  ̃, graphically illustrated by the greyly shaded rectangle between 
p1 and p2. It equals the difference of the monopolist’s output price under downstream 
competition and collusion, multiplied by the quantity sold to the cartel. In the simplified 
setting above, the price effect is negative. Generally, depending on the circumstances, it 
might also be positive or zero.
19
 
(3) A cost effect             ̃   ̃ as a result of the supplier’s lower production costs, 
illustrated by the lightly shaded rectangle between MC(x1) and MC(x2). The cost effect 
consists of the difference between the supplier’s marginal costs when producing the 
output x1 under downstream competition and x2 under collusion, multiplied by the actual 
sales volume. Depending on the cost function, it may either be positive, negative or 
zero.
20
 
In total, the damages of a direct cartel supplier amount to 
        ̃                    ̃  ̃               ̃   ̃   
In the simplified model above, the cost reduction due to lower production outweighs the lower 
selling price (“undercharge”) and counteracts the direct effect from a lower sales volume. It 
would thus be inappropriate and overstate the supplier’s harm to measure damages by looking 
only at the direct quantity effect. It is worth noting, however, that if marginal costs are 
constant, price and cost effects vanish, and only a direct quantity effect occurs.21 
2. General formal framework 
While the example of a supplier monopolist is straightforward, the general case with several 
firms on each layer is practically more relevant. The effects introduced above also exist in 
such a scenario. To illustrate, assume a vertical production chain comprising two layers 
upstream the cartel, which all have a one-to-one input-output-relation. On the top layer, m 
identical firms (indirect cartel suppliers) produce a non-substitutable good with constant 
marginal costs c. They sell it at a unit price q to n identical firms in the second layer (direct 
cartel suppliers). The n firms process the good and sell it at unit price p to identical firms in 
the third layer. Abstracting from additional costs, the selling price q of the m first layer firms 
equals the marginal costs of the n second layer firms. Total industry output is given as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
cartel would reduce its participants’ willingness to pay and thereby cause an inward shift of the inverse 
demand curve. 
18
  Negative in the sense that the supplier’s profit decreases compared to a competitive situation downstream. 
19
  See Han et al. (fn. 15) , p. 7. 
20
  In our example with increasing marginal costs, the effect is positive. Assuming constant marginal costs, the 
cost effect would completely vanish. In case of increasing economies of scale, the effect could also be 
negative, then increasing the overall damage. 
21
  For a formal prove of this aspect, see Han et al. (fn. 15).. 
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where xi2 and xj1 are quantities of a representative firm i and j on the second and first layer, 
respectively. Total output corresponds to the demand of the firms at the third layer, who are 
assumed to initially compete and subsequently collude.
22
 The upstream selling prices are 
given as q(X) and p(q(X)): The output price at the second layer p(q(X)) depends on input costs 
q(X), which depend on overall quantity X.  
Let the equilibrium values under competition be 
    ∑   
 
 
   
 ∑   
          
 
   
                   (     )   
and under collusion 
 ̃   ∑ ̃  
 
   
 ∑ ̃    ̃
 
   
  ̃( ̃)  ̃   ̃ ( ( ̃))   
For simplicity, we introduce p  and q*
 
as shortcuts for p(q(  )) and q(X*) and drop the 
arguments of the equilibrium values in the following.
23
 
The losses two representative firms j and i in the first and the second layer incur because of 
the downstream sellers’ cartel equal the difference between their profits under competition 
and collusion. The respective profits of a representative direct cartel supplier i amount to  
   
            
   and    ̃     ̃   ̃  ̃   
Subtracting π i2 from  ̃i2 and rearranging parameters yields his lost profits: 
     [(   
   ̃  )  
     ]   ̃    
   ̃   ̃    
   ̃    
Likewise, the profit of a representative indirect cartel supplier j before and after collusion is  
   
           
   and  ̃         ̃    
yielding cartel induced losses of 
     [(   
   ̃  )  
    ]   ̃    
   ̃   
Table 1 summarizes supplier damages and decomposes them into the quantity-, price- and 
cost effects described above: 
Table 1: Decomposition of damages 
Direct Supplier      [(   
   ̃  )  
     ]   ̃    
   ̃   ̃    
   ̃  
Quantity effect (   
   ̃  )  
      
Price effect  ̃    
   ̃  
Cost effect  ̃    
   ̃  
Indirect Supplier      [(   
   ̃  )  
    ]   ̃    
   ̃  
Quantity effect (   
   ̃  )  
     
Price effect  ̃    
   ̃  
                                                          
22
  We assume that all firms either collude or compete. Firms are therefore assumed not only to be identical with 
respect to production costs and other firm characteristics, but also to take concurrent decisions about whether 
to form a cartel. 
23 
 Likewise, we use the shortcuts  ̃ and  ̃ instead of  ̃ ( ( ̃)) and  ̃( ̃) in the following. 
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Cost effect - 
Compared to the graphical illustration, three aspects of this general case should be noted:  
First, as in the scenario of a supplier monopolist, lower input demand by cartel members may 
cause either higher upstream prices, lower prices or no price change at all. However, 
irrespective of the model specific assumptions, the most obvious strategic reaction of direct 
and indirect suppliers to decreasing demand is to lower their own output prices in order to 
mitigate and counteract the loss in demand. 
Second, assuming that m = n and  ̃i2 =  ̃j1, the price effect of the indirect supplier and the cost 
effect of the direct supplier exactly match. The direct supplier loses from lower sales but takes 
advantage of lower input costs. The indirect cartel supplier does not face a cost effect if 
marginal costs are constant at the top layer and is therefore more vulnerable to the direct 
quantity effect. 
Third, the number of firms on each upstream layer strongly influences suppliers’ damages. 
Assuming Cournot competition, the direct quantity effect sustained by one cartel supplier is 
decreasing in the number of symmetric cartel suppliers in the market. As a result, the follow-
on effects on prices and costs are also decreasing in the level of competition on the upstream 
layers. 
III. Supplier standing: US vs. EU compared 
Whereas economic analysis clearly identifies losses to suppliers of a sellers’ cartel, it is much 
less clear whether these suppliers are legally entitled to damages. In this respect, it should be 
noted that, in case of an international cartel, the countries affected usually provide for very 
different substantive and procedural rules governing actions for damages from which 
claimants may often choose to a certain extent:
24
 In Europe, the Brussels I Regulation
25
 – 
according to a widely shared, but controversial view – usually offers claimants alternative 
courts of jurisdiction in several member states,
26
 and, building on that, the Rome II 
Regulation
27
 roughly speaking allows plaintiffs to base their claims against all cartel members 
                                                          
24
  Brealey/Green (fn. 10), paras 5.02 et seq.; Jones/Sufrin (fn. 74), p. 1219. 
25
  Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
civil and commercial matters (“Brussels I”), OJ [2001] L 12/1. 
26
  See Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 308; Schreiber, KSzW 01.2011, 37, 39. Firstly, a company can generally be sued 
in the member state where it is domiciled (Art. 2 I, Art. 60 I Brussels I Regulation); secondly, a cartel 
member can be sued in the place where the harmful event occurred (Art. 5 III 3 Brussels I Regulation), i.e. 
either where the event which gave rise to the harm occurred, the courts of the state of this place having 
jurisdiction to award damages for all the harm caused, or where the harm arose, the courts of that state having 
jurisdiction only in respect of the damage caused in that state (Case C-68/09, Shevill et al. v. Press Alliance 
SA, [1995] ECR I-415, 462 para 33); thirdly, if cartel members are domiciled in different EU-countries, 
Article 6 I Brussels I Regulation allows to sue all of them in the courts of the state where (at least) one cartel 
member is domiciled, provided that all claims are so closely connected that it is reasonable to hear and 
determine them together – which is often considered to be the case with respect to cartel damages, Maton et 
al., 2 J of Eur Comp L & Practice, 489 (2011); Provimi Limited v. Aventis Animal Nutrition SA and Others 
[2003] E.C.C. 29, p. 353, para. 45-47; Cooper Tire & Rubber Company and Others v. Shell Chemicals UK 
Limited and Others [2009] EWHC 2609 (Comm), para. 34 et seqq., especially para. 64; confirmed in Cooper 
Tire Rubber & Rubber Company and Others v. Dow Deutschland Inc and Others [2010] EWCA Civ864 
para. 44; the details are however in dispute, see further Basedow/Heinze, in: Bechtold/Jickeli et al., Recht 
Ordnung und Wettbewerb, 2011, p. 63, 69 et seq.; Tang, 34 E.L. Rev. 80 (2009). 
27
  Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II), OJ [2007] L 199/40. 
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on the law of the member state where they file the action.
28
 This legislation has opened up a 
kind of competition between national fora, the decisive criterion being which offers the best 
prospects to claimants.
29
 In case of transatlantic cartels, claimants may furthermore decide to 
sue in the US.
30
 It is thus very important to compare and evaluate different approaches to 
standing of “non-standard” cartel victims, of which cartel suppliers are practically most 
relevant. 
1. US federal law  
a) General standard for standing 
The superficially clear
31
 wording of Sec. 4 Clayton Act seems to encompass every harm.
32
 
However, the US courts have declined to interpret the statute literally.
33
 The Supreme Court 
argued in Associated General Contractors, the leading case on antitrust standing,
34
 that the 
legislative history of Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act requires construing the provision in the light of 
its common-law background and the contemporary legal context in which Congress acted.
35
 
The court concluded that – contrary to the wording – the remedy cannot encompass every 
harm which can be traced to alleged wrongdoing. Over time, a two-pronged approach has 
developed to limit the universe of potential plaintiffs:
36
 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered “antitrust injury”, defined as “injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes the defendants' 
acts unlawful.”37 This is mainly to inhibit suits that would pervert the antitrust laws into an 
avenue to dampen competition.
38
  
Second, the plaintiff must have standing,
39
 that is he must be considered an efficient enforcer 
of the antitrust laws.
40
 This requires some analysis of the directness or remoteness of the 
                                                          
28
  Art. 6 III lit. b) of the Rome II Regulation under certain conditions allows a plaintiff who concentrates his 
actions against all cartel members in one court pursuant to Art. 6 paragraph 1 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(see fn. 26) to base all his claims on the law of the member state where he files the action (lex fori). Again, 
the details are unresolved; see further Brealey/Green (fn. 10), paras 6.08 et seq., 6.14 et seqq.; Mankowski, 
WuW 2012, 947 et seqq. 
29
  See Neumann, Juve 14 (2011), No. 12, 87; Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 308. 
30
  Claims for damages can be brought in the USA insofar as the cartel had effects there which were more than 
remote or indirect in nature, see briefly Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 309; for in depth analyses Huffman, 60 SMU 
Law Review 103 (2007); Connor/Bush, 112 Penn State Law Rev. 813 (2007-2008). 
31
  Areeda/Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis, 6th. ed. 2004, ¶ 144 p. 60. 
32
  See Associated General Contractors (fn. 11), 459 U.S. 519, 529. 
33
  Blue Shield of Virginia et al., v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476, 102 S.Ct. 2540. 2547; Todorov v DCH 
Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1448 (11
th
 Cir. 1991). 
34
  Todorov (fn. 34), 921 F.2d 1438, 1448 (11
th
 Cir. 1991); Altman/Pollack, in: Callmann on Unfair 
Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, 4
th
 ed., Database updated December 2012, § 4:49. 
35
  Associated General Contractors (fn. 11), 459 U.S. 519, 531-533. 
36
  Todorov (fn. 34), 921 F.2d 1438, 1449 (11
th
 Cir. 1991); Areeda/Kaplow (fn. 31), ¶ 144-146. 
37
  Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697 (1977). 
38
  See further Areeda/Kaplow (fn. 31), ¶ 146, p. 67-69. 
39
  It is unclear whether antitrust injury is a necessary component of standing or a separate requirement (see 
Page, 37 Stanford L. Rev. 1445, 1483 et seq. (1985); the former interpretation is advocated in Todorov (fn. 
34), 921 F.2d 1438, 1451 Fn. 20 (11
th
 Cir. 1991) and strongly suggested by Cargill v Monfort, 479 U.S. 104, 
110 Fn. 5, 107 S.Ct. 484, 489. By contrast, In re compact disc minimum advertised price 456 F. Supp. 2d 
131, 146 (D.Me. 2006)) conceives antitrust injury as a separate and not indispensable factor for standing. The 
question seems to be of little practical importance, if any, as antitrust injury and standing, despite the 
common goal, involve different questions, see Areeda/Kaplow (fn. 31), ¶ 146 p. 68; Page, 37 Stanford L. 
Rev. 1445, 1484 (1985). 
40
  Todorov (fn. 34), 921 F.2d 1438, 1449, 1450, 1452 (11
th
 Cir. 1991); Page, 37 Stanford L. Rev. 1445, 1483, 
1485 (1985); Cramer/Simons, in: Foer/Cuneo, The international handbook on private enforcement of 
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plaintiff’s injury. The Supreme Court has declined to derive a “black-letter rule” dictating the 
result in every case, but, building on previous case law, has identified relevant factors. In 
favour of standing, the court listed a causal connection between the antitrust violation and the 
harm and defendant’s intent to cause the harm.41 The factors militating against standing 
include: 
- The plaintiff being neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in which trade was 
restrained, 
- indirectness of injury, especially if there are other persons (more) directly affected and 
better suited to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement, 
- tenuous and speculative character of damages asserted and 
- potential of duplicative recovery and complex apportionment of damages due to 
conflicting claims by plaintiffs at different levels of the distribution chain.
42
 
b) Assessment of suppliers 
Pursuant to the case law sketched above, suppliers have standing if they can prove 
proximately caused injury-in-fact that can be measured reasonably and constitutes antitrust 
injury.
43
 The Supreme Court’s “multiple factor test” does however give the courts wide 
discretion to evaluate these criteria.
44
 As a consequence, no clear, consistent body of case law 
on supplier standing has evolved. The question is primarily relevant for direct cartel suppliers. 
As to indirect suppliers, the Illinois Brick rule
45
 bars claims for damages based on the federal 
antitrust laws.
46
 
As far as can be seen, the discussion centres mostly on employees and suppliers attacking 
mergers of their customers. While the former group is occasionally treated as a normal issue 
of supplier standing,
47
 it has a weaker case because the Clayton Act requires injury to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
competition law, 2011, p. 83, 90; similarly Cargill v Monfort, 479 U.S. 104, 110 n. 5, 107 S.Ct 484, 489 n. 5 
(“whether the petitioner was a proper plaintiff under § 4.”) and Crane, in: Hylton (ed.), Antitrust Law and 
Economics, 2010, p. 12 et seq. 
41
  Associated General Contractors (fn. 11), 459 U.S. 519, 536 et seq.; Exhibitors Service, Inc. v. American 
Multi Cinema, Inc., 788 F.2d 574, 578 (9
th
 Cir. 1986). Concerning intent, see however also Blue Shield of 
Virginia et al. (fn. 33), 457 U.S. 465, 479, stating that the “availability of the § 4 remedy (…) is not a 
question of the specific intent of the conspirators”, but then noting that the plaintiff suffered from the “very 
means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought to achieve its illegal ends. The harm to McCready and 
her class was clearly foreseeable; indeed, it was a necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal 
conspiracy.” 
42
  Associated General Contractors (fn. 11), 459 U.S. 519, 538-545; Cargill v Monfort, 479 U.S. 104, 112 Fn. 6, 
107 S.Ct. 484, 490 Fn. 6; Exhibitors Service, Inc. (fn. 41), 788 F.2d 574, 578 (9
th
 Cir. 1986); Serpa Corp. v. 
McWane, 199 F.3d 6, 10 (1
st
 Cir. 1999); on this case law Areeda/Kaplow (fn. 31), ¶ 145, p. 65 et seq.; 54 Am. 
Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade (updated Feb. 2013) § 384; Cramer/Simons, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 
40), p. 89. 
43
  Areeda/Hovenkamp (fn. 10), ¶ 350 p. 234. 
44
  Jones (fn. 77), p. 167. The main reason is that the Supreme Court has merely listed the relevant factors 
without explaining how they are to be weighted or whether some are more important than others.  
45
  In US federal antitrust law, the passing-on defence is not available and direct purchasers can recover the 
whole overcharge due to Hanover Shoe & Co v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation, 392 US 481 (1968) 
and Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 US 720 (1977).  
46
  Cf. Zinser v. Continental Grain Co. 660 F.2d 754, 760 et seq. (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941 (1982). 
However a number of states have effectively repealed Illinois Brick under their own antitrust statutes and in 
principle allow indirectly affected parties to sue, see Crane, in: Hylton (fn. 40), p. 13 et seq.; 
Hamilton/Henry, 5 Global Comp Litigation Rev. 111, 114 (2012). In California v. ARC America, 490 US 93 
(1989), the US Supreme Court held that Section 4 of the Clayton Act does not pre-empt such state laws. 
47
  See e.g. Page, 37 Stanford L. Rev. 1445, 1467 et seq., 1492 et seq. (1985); Areeda/Hovenkamp (fn. 10), ¶ 
350c p. 236. 
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“business or property”. A loss of employment or reduction in wages is often considered not to 
be such injury
48
 unless the plaintiff’s job is itself a commercial venture or enterprise49 or the 
conspiracy is directed at the employment market.
50
 In this respect employees, though 
suppliers of labour, are a special case.
51
 
With respect to “ordinary” suppliers seeking redress for losses from an antitrust law violation 
by
52
 their customers directed at downstream purchasers, most courts as well as leading 
commentators now deny a right to claim damages, albeit for different reasons: 
Some courts deny standing, arguing that the plaintiff and the conspirators must compete in the 
market in which trade was restrained, otherwise the harm being indirect and derivative
53
 and 
more direct victims the preferred plaintiffs.
54
 Page concedes that cartel suppliers suffer 
antitrust injury, since the greater the output restriction, the greater the loss of sales by 
suppliers.
55
 He denies standing, however, arguing that these harms resulted from the violator’s 
attempt to minimize costs and were entirely offset by a cost saving to the defendant. They 
were thus caused by a neutral aspect of the violation rather than by the welfare loss to 
consumers, so that allowing them as damages would cause overdeterrence.
56
 However, apart 
from the question how to justify this departure from ordinary law of damages,
57
 this reasoning 
                                                          
48
  E.g. Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F. 2d 727, 730-732 (10
th
 Cir.) (denying both injury to “business or 
property” and proximate injury), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Areeda/Kaplow (fn. 31), ¶ 145, p. 63. 
Nevertheless, standing has occasionally been granted to employees without discussing this aspect, see e.g. 
Wilson v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc., 320 F Supp. 699 (D. Colo 1970) (truck drivers suffering reduced wages 
and dismissal because of employers alleged horizontal conspiracy); standing denied: Contreras v. Gower 
Shipper Veg. Ass’n of Cent. Cal., 484 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1973) (employees of alleged price fixers were 
denied standing obviously because outside target area of the violation), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974). 
49
  Reibert (fn. 48), 471 F. 2d 727, 730. This explains Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Assn., 344 
F. Supp. 118, 153-154 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (sole owner whose salary was cash draw that depended on the 
financial situation of the firm); Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5
th
 Cir 1967) (employee of 
merger partner who was a salesman with his own territory, employed based on annually renewed contracts 
and receiving a salary that was on average more than half performance-related); Roseland v. Phister Mfg. Co, 
125 F. 2d 417 (7
th
 Cir. 1942) (dismissed employee had been general sales agent with performance-related 
remuneration). 
50
  For a comprehensive overview of the respective case law 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade 
(updated Feb. 2013) § 401. 
51
  Cf. the treatment by e.g. Areeda/Kaplow (fn. 31), ¶ 145(c), p. 63; 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraints 
of Trade (updated Feb. 2013) § 400-403; Cramer/Simons, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 40), p. 108 et seq. 
52
  To be distinguished from suppliers seeking redress for antitrust law violations directed against their 
customers. Such claims are mostly considered too remote from the antitrust violation and therefore not 
granted standing (see Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. 308 F.2d 383, 392, 395 (6
th
 Cir. 
1962); 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade (updated Feb. 2013) § 410) unless the plaintiffs 
are competitors of the alleged violator (Amarel v. Connel, 102 F.3d 1494, 1510 (9
th
 Cir. 1996); 
Areeda/Hovenkamp (fn. 10), ¶ 350d p. 240-242). 
53
  Exhibitors Service, Inc. (fn. 41), 788 F.2d 574, 579 (9
th
 Cir. 1986). 
54
  Genetic Systems Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 691 F.Supp. 407, 420 et seq. (D.D.C. 1988); Korshin v. 
Benedictine Hos., 34 F. Supp 2d. 133, 140 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); SAS of Puerto Rico, inc., v. Puerto Rico 
Telephone Company, 48 F.3d 39, 44. 
55
  Page, 37 Stanford L. Rev. 1445, 1467 et seq., 1493 (1985). 
56
  Page, 37 Stanford L. Rev. 1445, 1493 (1985). 
57
  If a tortfeasor causes damages, these are indemnifiable irrespective of whether they are simple welfare 
transfers or not. Otherwise, the victim of a theft should not be able to claim damages if the thief’s marginal 
utility of higher wealth is greater than the victim’s. The fact that certain consequences of an illegal act are 
mere welfare transfers seems therefore insufficient to deny a right to damages. Instead, in the US damages 
are restricted by two other criteria: First, the plaintiff must prove causation in fact, i.e. that his losses did not 
have occurred but for the defendant’s illegal conduct. Second, especially in negligence cases, the defendant’s 
conduct must have been a proximate cause to the plaintiff’s harm, i.e. the harm must have been the general 
kind that was unreasonably risked by the defendant. In this respect, the most general and pervasive approach 
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is imprecise: In the terminology of part II above, only the direct quantity effect and the price 
effect are pure welfare transfers from suppliers to cartel members, whereas the cost effect, if 
negative,
58
 may imply welfare losses to society that do not translate into higher prices for 
cartel customers. 
A more convincing variant of the argument denies antitrust injury. Areeda/Hovenkamp 
discuss the example of a merger which prompts the partners to increase prices, to reduce 
output and correspondingly input demand. They argue that, although suppliers suffer a loss 
from reduced sales due to the reduction in defendant’s output that is the reason for 
condemning the merger, this effect was “a by-product of the illegal merger rather than the 
rationale for making it illegal”. Such a loss fell short of being antitrust injury, as the injury 
occurred in another market than the lessening of competition that makes a defendant’s 
conduct illegal.
59
 In view of the foregoing, it is sometimes said that competitors and 
consumers in the relevant market are presumptively the proper plaintiffs to allege antitrust 
injury.
60
 
2. European Union 
a) EU-law guidelines 
aa) Case law 
As noted above, according to the ECJ case law “any individual” must be able to claim 
compensation for harm causally related to an infringement of EU competition law. This has 
led to considerable doubts whether traditional restrictions on standing in the laws of the 
member states are still tenable and spurred several reform initiatives
61
 to facilitate actions for 
damages, which, as a result, are becoming more common in Europe, too.
62
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
holds that a negligent defendant is liable for all the general kinds of harms he foreseeably risked by his 
negligent conduct and to the class of persons he put at risk by that conduct, see further 
Dobbs/Hayden/Bublick, The Law of Torts, 2
nd
 ed., § 13 (compensation), § 125 (factual and proximate cause), 
§ 186 (but-for test), § 198 (proximate cause). This approach is very similar to English law. English law 
basically comprises a but-for test of causation and a remoteness test, that asks whether the damages claimed 
were a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s illegal conduct, which is however not required for 
deliberate torts, see further Tettenborn/Wilby, The law of damages, 2
nd
 ed. 2010, p. 170 et seqq. (remoteness), 
p. 183 et seqq. (causation). 
58
  See fn. 20. 
59
  Areeda/Hovenkamp (fn. 10), ¶ 350 p. 237 et seq. With respect to an alleged horizontal conspiracy In re 
compact disc minimum advertised price 456 F.Supp. 2d 131, 146 et seq. (D.Me. 2006). 
60
  Serpa Corp. (fn. 42), 199 F.3d 6, 10 (1
st
 Cir. 1999) 
61
  On the latest reform package at European level see European Commission, Antitrust: Commission proposes 
legislation to facilitate damage claims by victims of antitrust violations, IP/13/525; FAQ: Commission 
proposes legislation to facilitate damage claims by victims of antitrust violations, MEMO/13/531. The 
package comprises i. a. a proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and the Council on certain 
rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions 
of the Member States and of the EU, COM(2013) 404 final. This proposal, besides specifying the acquis 
communautaire on the scope of damages, shall introduce a form of discovery (“disclosure of evidence”), 
prescribe the protection of leniency and settlement submissions, require mutual recognition of infringement 
decisions and harmonize certain aspects (limitation periods, joint and several liability, passing-on defence, 
availability of consensual dispute resolution, presumption of harm). For a critical review of earlier 
Commission’s initiatives Kloub, 5 ECJ 515, especially 516-518, 532-545 (2009). In the UK, the Department 
of Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) has just proposed important private enforcement reforms as part of the 
Draft Consumer Rights Bill of June 2013, see further BIS, Private Actions in competition law: A consultation 
on options for reform – government response, January 2013; Wisking/Dietzel/Herron, Comp Law Insight 19 
March 2013, 3-5. In Germany, the 8
th
 amendment of the German Act against restraints of Competition 
(GWB), in force since July 30
th
, 2013, has expanded private enforcement by consumer associations (§ 33 II 
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Currently, in the absence of community rules governing the matter,
63
 such claims are 
regulated by the member states subject to guiding principles of European law. In particular, 
according to the ECJ, it is for the domestic legal system of each Member State, subject to the 
principles of equivalence
64
 and effectiveness,
65
 
- to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay down the detailed procedural 
rules governing actions for safeguarding Community law rights,
66
 
- to prescribe the detailed rules governing the exercise of that right, including those on the 
application of the concept of ‘causal relationship’,67 
- to set the criteria for determining the extent of the damages for harm caused by an infringement of 
European Competition Law,
68
 provided that injured persons can seek compensation for actual loss 
as well as loss of profit plus interest
69
 
- and, finally, to prescribe the limitation period for seeking compensation.70 
In view of this seemingly disparate case law – on the one hand the apodictic demand to enable 
“any individual” to claim compensation, on the other hand the apparently remarkable leeway 
for national law – the fundamental question which properties characterize “any person” that 
must be able to claim damages is not straightforward to answer. The current Commission 
initiative to foster and harmonize certain aspects of private enforcement in the member states 
does not address it.
71
 The issue is complicated by the fact that a potential claimant’s right to 
sue depends, first, on the (minimum) conditions for liability determined by community law 
(existence of a right to damages), and, second, the exercise of that right pursuant to national 
law subject to the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
72
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
new version); other important changes to foster private enforcement were implemented with the 7
th
 
amendment, see Wurmnest, German L.J. 6 1173-1190 (2005). The developments in the EU have also 
triggered a reform initiative in Swiss, see Heinemann, Strukturberichterstattung Nr. 44/4, Evaluation 
Kartellgesetz, Die privatrechtliche Durchsetzung des Kartellrechts, Bern 2009. 
62
  Romain/Gubbay, The European Antitrust Review 2011, 47, 49-50; Rubinfeld, in: Elhauge (fn. 1), p. 378; 
Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 296 fn. 10. 
63
  The Commission is pressing for secondary EU legislation on private enforcement since several years. It is 
still too early to say whether or to what extent the current proposal (see fn.61) will be successful. 
64
  The national rules must not be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions. 
65
  The rules must not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by 
Community law. 
66
  Courage (fn. 5) [2001] ECR I-6297, para 29; Case C-295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, [2006] ECR I-6619, 
para 62, 71. 
67
  Manfredi (fn. 7) [2006] ECR I-6619, para 64. 
68
  Manfredi (fn. 7) [2006] ECR I-6619, para 92, 98. 
69
  Manfredi (fn. 7) [2006] ECR I-6619, para 95, 100. 
70
  Manfredi (fn. 7) [2006] ECR I-6619, para 81. 
71
  The draft proposal (see fn. 61) simply states in Art. 2 that “Anyone who has suffered harm caused by an 
infringement of Union or national competition law shall be able to claim full compensation (…)”, without 
specifying the group of eligible claimants. The draft proposal contains provisions on the passing-on defence 
only in relation to direct and indirect cartel purchasers (Art. 12 to 15) and suppliers of buying cartels (Art. 14 
II). But the Commission explicitly acknowledges in fn. 26 of the Commission Staff Working Document 
accompanying the Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based 
on breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, {C(2013) 3440}, 
that there are other persons “such as suppliers of the infringers” that “may also be harmed by infringements 
leading to price overcharges”. 
72
  Van Bael/Bellis, Competition Law of the European Community, 5th ed. 2010, p. 1224;in a similar vein 
Howard/Rose/Roth, in: Bellamy/Child (eds.), European Community Law on Competition,6
th
. ed. 2007, para 
14.111 including fn. 349, pointing to a similar duality with respect to the right to reparation of loss or damage 
caused to individuals by breaches of Community law attributable to a Member State, i.a. in Case C-46/93, 
Brasserie du Pêcheur, [1996] ECR 1029, paras 37-74, 81-90. 
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bb) Interpretation  
The case law being only fragmentary, the views about its implications differ widely. As a 
starting point, many authors share the view that the ECJ’s demand for “any individual” being 
able to claim compensation must in principle be taken literally.
73
 Therefore, at least some 
limitations in the laws of the member states are considered incompatible with Community 
law, in particular those based on the ‘protective scope’ of Art. 101, 102 TFEU.74 Moreover, 
there is much to suggest that Community law does not permit to sweepingly refuse damages 
to all market participants affected indirectly via pass-on effects.
75
 The Commission and some 
commentators even deduce from the Manfredi judgment that indirect purchasers must have 
standing to sue.
76
 
However, only few authors go on to conclude that all individuals harmed directly and 
indirectly by a competition law infringement actually have a Community law-based right to 
damages.
77
 Others stress that the ECJ has accepted certain limitations.
78
 In particular, national 
courts may deny a party damages to prevent unjust enrichment insofar as an infringement 
produced gains that offset losses claimed,
79
 and/or if that party bears significant responsibility 
for the distortion of competition.
80
 Taking up this case law, the majority of commentators 
hold the view that EU law allows to restrict the universe of potential claimants for reasons of 
remoteness,
81
 albeit without specifying this rather broad for European law still vague concept. 
                                                          
73
  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Joined Cases C-264/01, C-306/01, C-354/01 and C-355/01, AOK 
Bundesverband, ECR 2004, I-2493, para 104; Vrcek, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 40), p. 277, 283; Brealey/Green (fn. 
10), para 2.02; Alexander, Schadensersatz und Abschöpfung im Lauterkeits- und Kartelldeliktsrecht, 2010, p. 
329, 357 et seq.; Logemann, Der kartellrechtliche Schadensersatz, 2009, p. 107. 
74
  Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement, p. 192 f. including fn. 315; Eilmansberger, 41 CML Rev 1199, 
1226 et seq. (2004); Eilmansberger, 44 CML Rev 431, 465 (2007); Jones/Sufrin, EC Competition Law, 4
th
 
ed. 2011, p. 1204 et seq., 1211; Säcker/Jaecks, in: Münchener Kommentar Europäisches und Deutsches 
Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht), Vol. 1, 2007, Art. 81 EG para 890; to a large extent also Görner, Die 
Anspruchsberechtigung der Marktbeteiligten nach § 33 GWB, 2007, p. 78-82, 195-203; for an overview of 
national courts’ decisions and reforms abandoning such limitations see Howard/Rose/Roth, in: Bellamy/Child 
(fn. 72), para 14.112. 
75
  Jones (fn. 77), p. 195; Bulst, Bucerius Law Journal 2008, 81, 83; Vrcek, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 40), p. 277, 283. 
76
  White Paper on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165 final, p. 4, 7 et seq.; 
van Bael/Bellis (fn. 72), p. 1227; Bulst, NJW 2004, 2201; Cengiz, 59 ICLQ 39, 52 (2010); tentatively 
Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 301. By contrast, Lübbig, EuZW 2006, 536, 537 interprets the judgment as implicitly 
accepting (only) the passing on defense. In any case, it should be noted that the case at hand in Manfredi 
concerned end-consumers in a direct contractual relationship with the cartel members, although the contract 
was arranged through brokers. Therefore, neither the passing-on defence nor indirect purchaser standing 
came into play on the merits. This is sometimes overlooked; for instance Cengiz, 59 ICLQ 39, 52 (2010) 
mistakenly writes that the ECJ has faced the question of granting standing to indirect purchasers. 
77
  Komninos (fn. 74), p. 192 f. including fn. 315; Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust law, 1999, p. 187 (“It 
is submitted that, in the EC regime, the principal limitation on who can sue for damages will be the plaintiff’s 
evidence of causation”), 191; Vrcek, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 40), p. 277, 283. 
78
  Eilmansberger, 44 CML Rev 431, 461 (2007) conceives these as possible restrictions on standing; 
Säcker/Jaecks, in: Münchener Kommentar Europäisches und Deutsches Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht), 
Vol. 1, 2007, Art. 81 EG para 890. 
79
  Manfredi (fn. 7) [2006] ECR I-6619, para 94 with further references;  
80
  Courage (fn. 5) [2001] ECR I-6297, para 31; Ward/Smith, Competition Litigation in the UK, 2005, paras 
7-034 et seqq. 
81
  See generally Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Case C-128/92, H. J. Banks & Co. Ltd v British 
Coal Corporation, ECR 1994, I-1209, para 52; Eilmansberger, 44 CML Rev 431, 468 et seq. (2007); 
Howard/Rose/Roth, in: Bellamy/Child (fn. 72),para 14.113; Bulst, Bucerius Law Journal 2008, 81, 83; with 
respect to standing of indirect purchasers Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper 
on Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, para. 37; Fort, in: Mäger, Kartellrecht, 11. Teil, para 
44; Bulst, Schadensersatzansprüche der Marktgegenseite im EG-Kartellrecht, 2006, p. 248 et seqq.; Görner 
(fn. 74), p. 81 (if the causal relationship between the infringement and damages is merely accidental in 
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Other causality defences are in dispute, in particular the defence that the anti-competitive 
behaviour is no conditio sine qua non if the injury would have been sustained even in the case 
of lawful behaviour, and the argument that the victim could have avoided or minimized the 
damage by taking precautionary action.
82
 
The specific question whether or when direct and/or indirect cartel suppliers have an EU law 
based right to damages is rarely dealt with.
83
 In principle, it seems accepted that damage 
claims may arise if a supplier has to sell his products under less favourable conditions because 
of a cartel on the demand side,
84
 but usually authors do not distinguish buyers’ and sellers’ 
cartels. There are two notable exceptions: First, the Ashurst study briefly acknowledges 
damages of suppliers to a sellers’ cartel, but points towards complications with respect to their 
estimation and the restrictive approach in the US.
85
 Second, the study for the Commission by 
Oxera/Komninos et al. on quantifying of antitrust damages, starting from the ECJ case law on 
private damage actions, succinctly lists suppliers as eligible claimants.
86
 It can thus be said 
that, while most commentators overlook damages of suppliers to sellers’ cartels, the emerging 
view seems to be that the concept of “any individual” entitled to damages encompasses 
suppliers, though proof is considered difficult. This is confirmed by the Commission Staff 
Working Document accompanying the Communication on quantifying harm in actions for 
damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 TFEU
87
 mentioning in fn. 26 that other 
persons “such as suppliers of the infringers (…) may also be harmed by infringements leading 
to price overcharges”. Notwithstanding this, the standards of EU law remain largely open. 
This uncertainty naturally affects the laws of the member states. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
nature). But see also Ward/Smith (fn. 80), para 7-043, who consider the applicability of the remoteness test to 
be unclear. 
82
  Eilmansberger, 44 CML Rev 431, 468 et seq. (2007) advocates forbidding or severely restricting these 
defences as they impaired legal certainty and allocative efficiency. With respect to the second defence, his 
view seems however untenable as the ECJ has held in cases of state liability that “it is a general principle 
common to the legal systems of the Member States that the injured party must show reasonable diligence in 
limiting the extent of the loss or damage, or risk having to bear the damage himself”, Case C-46/93, 
Brasserie du Pêcheur, [1996] ECR 1029, paras 84 et seq.; joined Cases C-104/89 and C-37/90 Mulder and 
Others v Council and Commission [1992] ECR I-3061, para 33. As general principles common to the legal 
systems of the Member States are a major source of community law, there is no reason to think that this 
holding does not apply to damages for violations of EU competition law, too. Against this background, 
Ward/Smith (fn. 80), para 7-073 rightly consider the mitigation principle applicable in competition law 
damages claims. 
83
  Eilmansberger, 44 CML Rev 431, 461 (2007) and Säcker/Jaecks, in: Münchener Kommentar Europäisches 
und Deutsches Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht), Vol. 1, 2007, Art. 81 EG para 891 exclude suppliers of 
direct cartel victims for reasons of remoteness. Damages of victims’ suppliers are however arguably more 
remote than damages of (direct) cartel suppliers. 
84
  Vrcek, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 40), p. 277, 283; Meessen, Der Anspruch auf Schadensersatz bei Verstößen gegen 
EU-Kartellrecht, 2011, p. 219. 
85
  Clark/Hughes/Wirth, Analysis of Economic Models for the calculation of damages, in: Study on the 
conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules (Ashurst study), p. 15 para. 
2.15 et seq., including n. 20. 
86
  Oxera/Komninos et al., Quantifying antitrust damages - Towards non-binding guidance for courts, December 
2009, 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/, p. 27 (with respect to a price cartel); 
see also p. 24 (with respect to exclusionary conduct). 
87
  See fn. 71 above. 
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b) An exemplary look at two member states 
aa) England  
In English law, the claimant’s cause of action for damages for infringement of EU 
competition law is now
88
 generally considered to be the tort of breach of statutory duty.
89
 As 
claims for damages are usually settled, sometimes with considerable payments,
90
 there are no 
final judgments yet that have awarded damages to cartel victims and been upheld on appeal.
91
 
Recently, the CAT has awarded damages to the victim of an abuse of a dominant position.
92
 
In view of the small body of authoritative case law, it is an open question whether cartel 
suppliers are entitled to damages.
93
 Two conditions are of critical importance:
94
 
First, it is not sufficient for the claimant to show that the defendant’s breach was a causa sine 
qua non, i.e. that the loss would not have occurred but for the breach. Rather, the tortious 
conduct must have been a cause that, from a normative point of view, is considered material 
enough to justify damages. This requires that 
- the breach was a substantial, direct or effective cause that cannot be ignored for the 
purpose of legal liability,
95
  
- the loss was not caused by the claimants own mismanagement or another intervening 
cause,
96
 which will probably require a supplier to show that the cartel members did not 
cut supplies from him for other commercial reasons (such as quality), and that  
- the injury is sufficiently proximate.97 
                                                          
88
  The question was unclear for a long period of time; apart from breach of statutory duty, other torts were 
discussed, such as unlawful interference with trade, or a new tort to reflect the EU nature of the claim, see 
Jones/Sufrin (fn. 74), p. 1214. 
89
  Garden Cottage Foods Ltd v Milk Marketing Board [1984] AC 130, 141; Devenish Nutritition Ltd. v. Sanofi-
Aventis SA (France) [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch), para 18, per Lewison J.; Lesley Farrell/Neil Davies, The 
European Antitrust Review 2010, p. 246-253; Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 16.02, 17.02; Clough/ 
McDougall, United Kingdom report, in: Ashurst Study (fn. 85), p. 3; sceptical Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 309, 
pointing to the effet utile of Community law. Resorting to the tort of breach of statutory duty is the general 
approach in English law with respect to EU-law rights which must be given effect without further enactment, 
see Sempra Metals Ltd (formerly Metallgesellschaft Ltd) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2008] 1 A.C. 
561, para 69, per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. 
90
  See the studies of Rodger, 29 E.C.L.R. 96-116 (2008), Rodger, 27 E.C.L.R. 341, 346 (2006), and besides the 
references provided by Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 315 et seq., fn. 185.  
91
  Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 16.36; Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 316.  
92
  2 Travel Group PLC (in liquidation) v Cardiff City Transport Services Limited, [2012] CAT 19. 
93
  For a short general list of the elements a claimant must show when making a claim for damages based on 
breach of statutory duty see Jones/Sufrin (fn. 74), p. 1214. 
94
  See Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 17.03 et seqq. 
95
  Bailey v Ministry of Defence [2008] EWCA Civ. 883, [2009] 1 WLR 1052, 1066-69; Stanley v Gypsum 
Mines Ltd. [1953] AC 663, 687, per Lord Asquith; Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 17.03. This is important if 
several necessary factors contributed to the loss (see generally McGregor on Damages, 18
th
 ed. 2009, para 6-
016 et seqq.). It is still an open question whether the courts will then take a broad ‘but for’ approach to 
causation, rigorously apply the requirement that the competition law violation must be the substantial, direct 
or effective cause of the loss claimed, or whether the courts will predicate this on the infringement in 
question. If a court finds that some of the defendant’s conduct that led to the claimant’s loss infringed 
competition law, while other of the conduct was legitimate, the court could also apportion loss on an 
approximate basis to the different effective causes, see further Brealey/Green (fn. 10), paras 17.03, 17.06. 
96
  Cf. Arkin v Borchard, [2003] EWHC 687 (Comm), [2003] Lloyd’s Rep 225, paras 538-555 (claimant’s own 
mismanagement as intervening cause), para 568 (infringement not predominant cause); Crehan v 
Inntrepreneur Pub Company (CPC), [2003] EWHC 1510 (Ch), paras 240-248 (no mismanagement); 
Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 17.04. 
97
  Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 17.05. 
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Second, and probably the crucial hurdle for cartel suppliers, a claimant who sues for breach of 
statutory duty must in principle show that the duty was owed to him, meaning (1) that the 
statute imposes a duty for the benefit of the individual harmed, and that (2) the duty was in 
respect of the kind of loss suffered.
98
 In Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company, the defendant 
raised this issue as a defence before the Court of Appeal, referring – apart from English 
authorities – to the doctrine of antitrust injury as stated by the Supreme Court in Brunswick.99 
The defendant argued that the claimant need not only prove a causal link between the illegal 
distortion of competition at hand and the loss, but also that the loss was of a type Art. 101(1) 
intended to prevent. The defendant disputed this because Crehan had not suffered from 
restricted competition in the market for the supply of beer to on-trade outlets, which made the 
tying arrangement at issue violate Art. 101 TFEU, but from the beer tie distorting competition 
with other pubs free of tie. The Court of Appeal accepted “as a matter of English law” that the 
duty breached must be in respect of the kind of loss suffered.
100
 However, English law must 
be interpreted such that liability is imposed where required by EU law.
101
 The Court of 
Appeal therefore rejected the argument in the case at hand, inferring from the ECJ’s 
preliminary ruling that Community law conferred onto Crehan a right to the type of damages 
claimed.
102
 
The case law leaves thus open whether the English law principle can ever apply in the context 
of European competition law.
103
 In any case, the principle cannot be applied narrowly: In 
particular, the ECJ judgment in Courage shows that the loss need not occur in the same 
market than the illegal restriction of competition. Some commentators conclude that the 
requirement that the statute imposes a duty for the benefit of the individual harmed is always 
satisfied in cases involving Art. 101 and 102 TFEU.
104
 Building on this view, others argue 
that cartel suppliers are entitled to damages pursuant to English law.
105
 This arguably pertains 
to indirect suppliers, too. While the question whether the passing-on defence is available in 
English lawhas been not been decided by the courts yet,
106
 the emerging position is to accept 
it,
107
 which should imply, that, conversely, indirect victims are in principle entitled to claim 
damages
108
 if they meet the standard of proof.
109
 
                                                          
98
  SAAMCO v York Montague Ltd [1997] AC 191, 211 et seq., per Lord Hoffmann; Gorris v Scott (1874) LR 9 
Ex 125; with respect to competition law actions for damages Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 17.08; Jones/Sufrin 
(fn. 74), p. 1214. 
99
  Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company (CPC) [2004] EWCA Civ 637, para 156 et seq. 
100
  Crehan (fn. 99) [2004] EWCA Civ 637, para 158. 
101
  Jones/Sufrin (fn. 74), 1214. 
102
  Crehan (fn. 99) [2004] EWCA Civ 637, para 167. 
103
  Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 17.10; Jones/Sufrin (fn. 74), p. 1218. 
104
  Jones/Sufrin (fn. 74), p. 1215; in a similar vein Ward/Smith (fn. 80), para 7-017. 
105
  See e.g. Smith/Maton/Campbell, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 40), p. 296, 300. 
106
 For comprehensive discussions see Brealey/Green (fn. 10), paras 16.13-16.32, with short summaries of the 
legal situations in the US and some EU member states; Ward/Smith (fn. 80), paras 7-044 et seqq. 
107
  In Emerald Supplies Ltd v British Airways plc [2009] EWHC 741, [2010] Ch 48, para 37 the Chancellor 
remarked obiter that the judgment in Hanover Shoe was “a policy decision not open to the courts in 
England”, damage being a necessary ingredient on the cause of action; furthermore, Longmore LJ in 
Devenish Nutrition Ltd. V Sanofi-Acventis SA (France) [2008] EWCA 1086, [2009] Ch 390, para 147, 
followed by Tuckey, LJ, para 158, strongly disfavoured allowing victims to claim damages that they have 
passed on, which would mean “transferring monetary gains from one underserving recipient to another 
undeserving recipient (…)”; in the same vein Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 310 et seq. 
108
  Clough/ McDougall, United Kingdom report, in: Ashurst Study (fn. 85), p. 24 et seq. The issue might be 
decided soon, see Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 311. 
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bb) Germany 
In Germany, the prospects of suppliers to claim lost profits changed considerably with the 7
th
 
amendment of the German Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen 
Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) in 2005: Before the 7
th
 amendment, many lower courts 
held that the then-applicable version of the cartel prohibition protected and therefore entitled 
to damages only those directly aimed at by a competition law infringement (doctrine of the 
protective purpose, Schutznormtheorie),
110
 thereby excluding suppliers of a sellers’ cartel. 
However, the interpretation, that has only recently been overruled by the German Federal 
Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) on the occasion of a case predating the 7
th
 amendment,
111
 
was hardly compatible with the ECJ case law since Courage. This prompted the legislator to 
reform the relevant provision in the GWB.
112 
Since the reform, the GWB stipulates a right to damages for every person affected, defined as 
everybody who, as a competitor or other market participant, is adversely affected by the 
infringement.
113
 Insofar the legislator abandoned the doctrine of the protective purpose.
114
 
“Other market participants” are understood broadly. The term comprises all natural persons 
and legal entities that are potentially adversely affected in their market behaviour
115
 by a 
competition law infringement.
116
 The legislator explicitly intended suppliers to belong to 
these ‘other market participants’, regardless of whether the cartel deliberately aimed at 
them.
117
 This seems widely accepted
118
 and includes direct and – subject to remoteness – 
indirect suppliers. After much controversy concerning the passing-on defense,
119
 the German 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
109
 The claimant must prove its allegations on the balance of probabilities, whereat, the more unlikely the alleged 
infringement, the stronger the evidence must be to establish it. Furthermore, the claimant must demonstrate 
that the anti-competitive behaviour caused the loss suffered, which does not require the same high 
evidentiary standard than the proof of the infringement, see further Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 16.03-16.12; 
briefly Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 309-311. 
110
  See further Bornkamm, in: Langen/Bunte, Kommentar zum Deutschen und Europäischen Kartellrecht, Vol. 
1, 11
th
 ed. 2011, § 33 paras 18, 25-28; Bulst, NJW 2004, 2201, 2201 et seq., both pointing out that this view 
was not predetermined by the case law of the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) at that time, 
which had merely held that “at least” the persons directly aimed at by the infringement had a right to 
damages; Alexander (fn. 73), p. 370; Bechtold, GWB, 6
th
 ed. 2010, § 33 para 9; critical Hempel, Privater 
Rechtsschutz im Kartellrecht, p. 42 et seqq. 
111
  BGH, case KZR 75/10, Selbstdurchschreibepapier (“ORWI“), NJW 2012, 928, 929, paras 16 et seq. 
112
  See government justification for the 7th amendment of the German Act against restraints of competition, 
Bundestag document No. 15-3640, p. 35, 53; Bornkamm, in: Langen/Bunte (fn. 110), § 33 GWB paras 17-20. 
113
  Section 33 subsection 3 sentence 1 in conjunction with subsection 1 sentence 3 GWB. 
114
  Hempel, WuW 2004, 362, 368; Bornkamm, in: Langen/Bunte (fn. 110), § 33 GWB paras 16, 20. 
115
  This excludes claims by employees as well as shareholders only because the cartel members are fined for the 
infringement. Both groups are then affected by the deterioration of the company’s financial statuts, not by 
effects on their market behaviour, Görner (fn. 74), p. 164. 
116
  Staebe, in: Schulte/Just, Kartellrecht, 2012, § 33 GWB para 9, 28; Bechtold, GWB, 6th ed. 2010, § 33 para 
10; Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker (fn. 10), § 33 para 27; Emmerich, Kartellrecht, 12th. ed. 2012, § 8 
para 16; in principle also Fort (fn. 81), para 44; for an overview about current scholarly opinions and an in 
depth analysis Meessen (fn. 84), p. 172-189. 
117
  See the government justification for the 7th amendment of the German Act against restraints of competition, 
Bundestag document No. 15-3640, p. 35, 53; on the justification see Meessen (fn. 84), p. 169, 181; 
Zimmer/Höft, ZGR 5/2009, 662, 683;  
118
  See for instance explicitly including cartel suppliers Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker (fn. 10), § 33 paras 
22, 28; Emmerich (fn. 116), § 8 para 16, § 40 para 8; Bornkamm, in: Langen/Bunte (fn. 110), § 33 GWB § 33 
GWB paras 20, 36. 
119
  While some scholars argued that all affected market participants are entitled to damages (for instance 
Emmerich, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker (fn. 10), § 33 para 29; Emmerich (fn. 116), § 40 para 20 et seq.; 
Zimmer/Höft, ZGR 5/2009, 662, 683 et seq. fn. 109; Bornkamm, in: Langen/Bunte (fn. 110), § 33 GWB paras 
101 in conjunction with 37, 42-44), others were of the view that only those in direct contact with the cartel 
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Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH) endorsed it in 2012, holding that the group of 
potential claimants is restricted only by the requirement of a causal link between the illegal 
cartel and the damages claimed.
120
 
There are thus good reasons to conclude that lost profits of suppliers resulting from an output 
reduction by the cartel members are in principle recoverable as damages pursuant to German 
law.
121
 It should however be noted that some legal uncertainty remains. In particular, 
according to a view that relies on the government justification for the reform act, a market 
participant is only entitled to damages if there is a more than accidental link, an inner 
coherence between the reasons that make the defendants conduct a competition law violation 
and the adverse effect on the market participant (so called Zurechnungs- oder 
Rechtswidrigkeitszusammenhang).
122
 This might be used to exclude cartel suppliers.
123
 
Besides, there are doubts whether claims by suppliers are enforceable in practice. Sometimes 
they are deemed to be speculative in nature and very unlikely to be proven.
124
 In particular, 
similar to England, the defendant’s action need not only be a conditio sine qua non for the 
loss (äquivalente Kausalität), but damages must also be attributable to the defendant from a 
normative point of view (adäquate Kausalität). Besides, a competition law infringement is 
not considered causal for damages that would have occurred but for the infringement, too.
125
 
The supplier must therefore show that the cartel member(s) had bought more inputs just from 
him (i.e. not from a competing supplier). This task is however alleviated by the legal 
presumption of lost profits in sec. 252 of the German Civil Code (BGB)
126
 if the supplier 
could reasonably expect to sell a certain quantity to the cartel members,
127
 e. g. because of a 
stable customer-client relationship. 
IV. The case for and against cartel supplier standing in the EU 
1. Lessons from the US? 
In view of, on the one hand, the open questions concerning the scope of the right to damages 
for infringements of EU competition law, and, on the other hand, the considerable experience 
gained with intense private enforcement in the US, it suggests itself to ask whether the US 
approach to supplier standing could – in whole or in part – be a model for private enforcement 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
members could claim damages (e.g. Bechtold, GWB, 6th ed. 2010, § 33 para 11, 20; Koch, WuW 2005, 
1210, 1217-1222). 
120
  BGH, case KZR 75/10, Selbstdurchschreibepapier (“ORWI“), NJW 2012, 928, 929 et seqq., 931 para 35; 
Staebe (fn. 116), para 28. 
121
  Logemann (fn. 73), p. 239. 
122
  Bornkamm, in: Langen/Bunte (fn. 110), § 33 GWB paras 22 et seq.; Meessen (fn. 84), p. 185-189; generally 
Grüneberg, in : Palandt, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, 72
nd.
 ed. 2013, Vorb § 249 paras 29 et seqq.  
123
  For instance Meessen (fn. 84), p. 189 argues that market participants entitled to damages pursuant to German 
law are only those whose freedom of action and choice is restricted. This may or may not be true for 
suppliers to a price cartel, depending on how important the cartel members are as customers. 
124
  Logemann (fn. 73), p. 239. 
125
  Bechtold, GWB, 6. Aufl. 2010, § 33 Rn. 27  
126
 Sec. 252 BGB sentence 1 stipulates that the damage to be compensated for also comprises the lost profits. 
Sentence 2 adds that those profits are considered lost that in the normal course of events or in the special 
circumstances, particularly due to the measures and precautions taken, could probably be expected. 
127
 This might be the case for instance because the supplier produced inputs specifically designed for the needs of 
the cartel firms. 
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in the EU. This crucially depends on the comparability of the framework conditions in the 
respective legal systems.
128
 
Standing limitations in the US are to a large extent explained by the draconian treble damages 
remedy. Combined with opt-out class-actions, pre-trial discovery and contingency fees, it 
makes claims for damages very attractive for purported victims, implying a high risk of 
duplicative recovery and complex apportionment.
129
 In the US, it is therefore essential to 
tightly limit the universe of potential plaintiffs. If, as a collateral consequence, some damages 
are not recoverable, automatic trebling can in principle make up for such a slippage.
130
 
Tellingly, when treble-damages are no concern, the US courts adopt a more liberal approach 
to standing. This holds in particular for sec. 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 26)
131
 which 
provides for injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage when and under the same 
conditions and principles as injunctive relief is granted by courts of equity. In this setting, the 
courts are less concerned about whether the plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust 
laws because the dangers of mismanaging them are less pervasive,
132
 the risk of duplicative 
recovery or the danger of complex apportionment that pervade the analysis of standing under 
sec. 4 Clayton Act being irrelevant.
133
 
In a similar vein, even if to a somewhat lesser extent, the risks of duplicative recovery and 
complex apportionment are less important in the EU compared to the US, because the EU 
member states do only exceptionally provide for treble damages
134
 and, while providing for 
certain collective action mechanisms, reject opt-out class actions.
135
 Moreover, a loser-pays 
                                                          
128
  Cf. Brealey/Green (fn. 10), para 16.17 fn. 26. 
129
  Cargill v Monfort, 479 U.S. 104, 111, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490; Blue Shield of Virginia et al. (fn. 33), 457 U.S. 
474-475. 
130
  Crane, in: Hylton (fn. 40), p. 13. 
131
  See Altman/Pollack, in: Callmann on Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, 4
th
 ed., Database 
updated December 2012, § 4:49; 54 Am. Jur. 2d Monopolies and Restraints of Trade (updated Feb. 2013) § 
382; Cramer/Simons, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 40), p. 87. 
132
  Todorov (fn. 34), 921 F.2d 1438, 1452 (11
th
 Cir. 1991). 
133
  Cargill v Monfort, 479 U.S. 104, 111, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490; Todorov (fn. 34), 921 F.2d 1438, 1452 (11
th
 Cir. 
1991). While the standing is therefore less restrictive for a plaintiff seeking an injunction under section 16 of 
the Clayton Act, the plaintiff must allege threatened injury that would constitute antitrust injury in the same 
way as in a claim for damages. This is to prevent contradicting results, because, as the Supreme Court put it, 
“would be anomalous (...) to read the Clayton Act to authorize a private plaintiff to secure an injunction 
against a threatened injury for which he would not be entitled to compensation if the injury actually 
occurred.”, Cargill v Monfort, 479 U.S. 104, 112, 107 S.Ct. 484, 490. 
134
  Exemplary damages for competition law violations in England are not awarded regularly but rather 
exceptionally, see 2 Travel Group PLC (in liquidation)(fn. 92), paras 448 et seq. 
135
  The non-binding Commission Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union 
Law, C(2013) 3539/3, a part of the recent reform package (see above note 61), explicitly rejects US-style 
class actions (cf. recital 15 and Commission recommends Member States to have collective redress 
mechanisms in place to ensure effective access to justice, IP/13/524, p. 3). While many EU member states 
provide for some form of opt-in group claim (see with respect to German, English and Dutch law Maton et 
al., 2 J of Eur Comp L & Practice, 489 (2011); for a very concise and rather rough overview about all 
member states Buccirossi/Carpagnano et al., Collective Redress in Antitrust, Study for the Policy 
Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy, 2012, p. 19 et seqq.), currently no member state provides for 
opt-out class actions for damages with respect to competition law infringements. In the UK, the BIS however 
wants to introduce collective proceedings before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) as part of the Draft 
Consumer Rights Bill (fn. 61). The CAT would authorize such actions as opt-in or opt-out proceedings (sec. 
47B (7)(c) Draft Consumer Rights Bill). It remains to be seen whether this part of the Bill will be enacted in 
the end. In any case, opt-out collective actions would include only class members domiciled in the UK (cf. 
sec. 47B (11) (b)); in all collective actions, an award of exemplary damages would be excluded (sec. 47C(1)), 
damages based agreements (contingency fees) prohibited (sec. 47C(7)), the loser pays rule would apply and a 
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rule applies to the costs of trial. In such an institutional framework, only those who suffered 
significant and provable losses have an incentive to sue for damages. Therefore, in the EU, 
compared to the US, more persons that might suffer losses from a cartel can confidently be 
granted a right to damages. In certain respects, this is already current case law. In particular, 
as Crehan shows, in the EU, unlike in the US, a right to damages does not require the loss to 
occur in the same market than the lessening of competition that makes the defendant’s 
conduct illegal. It follows that the type of loss which the competition provisions are intended 
to prevent is broader in the EU than in the US. 
2. The purpose of a right to damages as the guiding principle for standing 
The insight that the EU framework allows for more generous standing leads to the question 
how the scope of the right to claim damages should be delimited in the EU. The key to the 
answer, in our opinion, is the purpose the legal system assigns to that right. In the US, a major 
purpose of private actions for damages is to deter antitrust law violations:
136
 Private plaintiffs 
are enlisted as “private attorney generals”137 to complement the resources of the antitrust 
authorities. Such a utilitarian perspective justifies restricting standing to those who can 
efficiently enforce the antitrust laws, even if this means that some victims remain 
uncompensated, while others receive windfall profits.
138
 The same result is hard to justify in a 
legal system like the EU where damages fulfil at least equally a compensatory purpose.
139
 In 
view of this goal, awards should mirror the claimant’s losses as closely as possible, whereas 
inaccuracy can create injustice.
140
 
3. The case for supplier standing in the EU 
On the basis of the guiding principle just proposed, there is much to suggest that damages of 
direct cartel suppliers should be recoverable pursuant to EU-law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
damage award, insofar as it is not claimed by the class members, would have to paid to the charity (sec. 
47C(5)). The proposal thus differs considerably from the US class action system. 
136
  Rubinfeld, in: Elhauge (fn. 1), p. 378; Crane, in: Hylton (fn. 40), p. 1; Huffman, 60 SMU Law Review 103, 
113 (2007). 
137
  Cf. Associated General Contractors (fn. 11), 459 U.S. 519, 542; Exhibitors Service, Inc. (fn. 41), 788 F.2d 
574, 581 (9
th
 Cir. 1986); Cuneo, in: Foer/Cuneo (fn. 40), p. 27. 
138
  Even if the injury of one potential claimant is truly “inextricably intertwined” with injury of another, the 
Supreme Court may decide that either of them, but not both may recover, to avoid the risk of duplicative 
recovery and the practical problems inherent in distinguishing the losses suffered, see Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061 (1977); Blue Shield of Virginia et al. (fn. 33), 457 U.S. 465, 492 (Justice 
Rehnquist, with whom The chief Justice and Justice O'Connor join, dissenting). 
139
  The ECJ lists the preventive and the compensatory purpose of damages without suggesting a hierarchy, see 
case C-536/11, Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v Donau Chemie, paras 23 et seq.; less pronounced case C-
295/04 to C-298/04, Manfredi, [2006] ECR I-6619, para 89, 91, 94. Many commentators and member states 
courts, including the Commission, do however consider compensation to be the primary purpose, see the 
draft proposal for a damages directive, COM(2013) 404 final (fn. 61), p. 13 and Art. 2; Almunia, Public 
enforcement and private damages actions in antitrust, SPEECH/11/598, European Parliament, ECON 
Committee, Brussels, 22 September 2011, p. 2-3; Nebbia, E.L. Rev. 2008, 33(1), 23-43; Komninos, Comp 
Law Rev. 3 (Dec. 2006) 5, 9, 10; Jones, World Comp 27(1) (2004), 13-24; Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 297; 
BGH, case KZR 75/10, Selbstdurchschreibepapier (“ORWI“), NJW 2012, 928, 931, paras 36-38, p. 933 para. 
62. Notably, this does not exclude to acknowledge and strengthen that private actions for damages also 
contribute to preventing infringements, see Komninos, Comp Law Rev. 3 (Dec. 2006) 5, 9 et seq.; Wagner, 
German Working Papers in Law and Economics, Vol. 2007, Paper 18, p. 3-10; Zimmer/Höft, ZGR 2009, 662, 
688; BGH, case KZR 75/10, Selbstdurchschreibepapier (“ORWI“), loc. cit. 
140
  Wils, World Comp 26(3) (2003), 473, 479. 
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First, as shown above, suppliers regularly suffer losses from a cartel, and thereby come within 
the scope of “any individual” in the words of the ECJ. 
Second, full compensation as an at least equal purpose of competition law actions for 
damages
141
 requires covering all losses accurately and precisely, as long as no exception is 
justified. Four justifications seem particularly relevant: (1) remoteness – if damages are 
remote, litigation is costly and prone to errors that impair prevention (deterrence);
142
 (2) 
unjust enrichment – in this case the plaintiff would receive a windfall undefendable from a 
corrective justice point of view;
143
 (3) the victim itself bears significant responsibility for the 
infringement – then allowing for damages would create an ex-ante incentive to contravene the 
law; (4) the victim could have easily and cheaply avoided the damage – then allowing for 
compensation would encourage socially inefficient behaviour.
144
 Neither of these 
justifications invariably applies to damages (at least) of direct cartel suppliers. It would 
therefore seem arbitrary to outrightly exclude this group from a right to damages, conflicting 
with the general principle of equal treatment that requires that comparable situations not be 
treated differently and different situations not be treated alike unless it is objectively 
justified,
145
 now enshrined as a fundamental right in Art. 20 GRCh.
146
  
Third, recognizing suppliers as eligible claimants suits well with the ECJ case law that, 
notwithstanding the compensatory purpose, assigns the community law right to damages a 
preventive purpose, too.
147
 Advocate General van Gerven even posits that Community law 
requires the civil law consequences themselves, in particular the right to damages of any 
individual, to have a deterrent effect (instead of only contributing to discourage 
infringements).
148
 Given that not all infringements are detected and that not all victims of 
detected infringements sue, single damages will arguably only make a significant contribution 
to preventing infringements and thereby have a deterrent effect if the class of eligible 
claimants is not defined narrowly. This suggests that direct and indirect cartel suppliers 
should in principle have a right to damages.
149
 Such a broad definition of potential claimants 
would also fit well with the ECJ case law in other fields. In particular, the ECJ has enlisted 
EU citizens as supervisors over the decentralized enforcement of EU law by granting citizens 
                                                          
141
  See references in fn. 139. 
142
  This holds for type I and type II errors, see Schinkel/Tuinstra, Int. J. Ind. Organ. 2006, 1267, 1287 et seq.  
143
  See Wils, World Comp 26(3) (2003), 473, 487. 
144
  See on the established principle to assign liability to the so called least-cost avoider (also cheapest cost 
avoider) Calabresi, The costs of accidents (1970), p. 135 et seqq.; Schäfer/Müller-Langer, in: Faure, Tort 
Law and Economics, 2009, p. 16 et seq.; Ben-Shahar, in: Bouckaert/De Geest (eds.), Encyclopedia of Law 
and Economics, Vol II. Civil Law and Economics, 2000, p. 644, 645 et seq.; Shavell, Foundations of 
Economic Analysis of Law, p. 189 et seq.; Landes/Posner, 12 Journal of Legal Studies, 109, 110 (1983);  
145
  Case C-292/97, Kjell Karlsson et al., [2000] ECR I-2737, para 39; Case T-347/94, Mayr-Melnhof 
Kartongesellschaft v Commission, [1998] ECR II-1751, para 352; case T-13/03, Nintendo v Commission, 
[2009] ECR II-947, paras 95, 170. 
146
  See the explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (ChFR), OJ No C 303, 14.12.2007, p. 17, 
24. The explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter and shall 
be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States, Art. 52 paragraph 7 ChFR. 
147
  Courage (fn. 5) [2001] ECR I-6297, para 27; Manfredi (fn. 7) [2006] ECR I-6619, para 91. 
148
  Opinion of Advocate General Van Gerven, Case C-128/92, H. J. Banks & Co. Ltd v British Coal 
Corporation, ECR 1994, I-1209, para 54; disagreeing Säcker/Jaecks, in: Münchener Kommentar 
Europäisches und Deutsches Wettbewerbsrecht (Kartellrecht), Vol. 1, 2007, Art. 81 EG para 842. 
149
 This holds in particular as long the member states, is it is currently the case, do not combine exemplary or 
punitive damages and group claims as regular instruments. 
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generous standards for standing to sue the member states for benefits that flow from EU-
law.
150
 
4. Objections 
While there are good arguments for granting suppliers of price cartels an EU law based right 
to damages, there are also some important counterarguments. Not all of these, however, are 
convincing.  
a) Supplier damages reflective? 
First, suppliers’ damages from a sellers’ cartel could at first blush considered to be reflective, 
in the sense of merely mirroring the competition law infringement in relation to cartel 
customers:
151
 customers pay higher prices and therefore buy less, the quantity reduction 
affecting the whole production chain. This view is however too simplistic, as a closer look 
from a law and economics perspective reveals,:  
Suppliers primarily suffer a negative direct quantity effect. This effect will usually not 
translate into customer damage claims, because those customers priced out of the market 
(potential customers) are often not able to show and prove damages: End-consumers who did 
not buy (or bought less) do not even suffer damages in the legal sense, as the law 
acknowledges only monetary losses or lost profits, not losses of utility. At best, cartel 
customers at intermediate layers of the production chain could claim lost profits if they 
overcome difficulties of proof.
152
 But when calculating the lost profits of such claimants, their 
foregone earnings must be reduced by their hypothetical input costs that comprise all profit 
margins (hypothetically) charged by upstream firms. As a consequence, even if cartel 
customers claim lost profits with respect to units not bought, their damages do not include the 
direct quantity effect suffered by suppliers. 
Cartel customers primarily claim the overcharge, i.e. the price increase for the units actually 
produced and sold. As shown above, with respect to these units cartel suppliers may face a 
positive or a negative price effect. (Only) a negative effect (“undercharge”) contributes to 
suppliers’ damages. By contrast, such an effect does not add to consumer damages: Either the 
cartel passes on the lower input costs, which then reduce the overcharge and thereby 
consumer damages, or the cartel retains the decrease in input costs to achieve a higher margin, 
which again does not increase consumer damages, because the overcharge is calculated with 
reference to the input price under competition. On the other hand, while the negative price 
effect for suppliers fits easily within the basic legal definition of damages – suppliers face 
losses that would not have occurred but for the cartel, which is a proximate cause (condition 
sine qua non) – the negative price effect mitigates the cartel’s overall negative welfare 
                                                          
150
  Case 26/62, van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1, 13: “The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their 
rights amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to 
the diligence of the Commission and of the Member States.” see further v. Danwitz, Europäisches 
Verwaltungsrecht, 2008, p. 283–285; Craig, EU law, 5th ed. 2011, p. 183 et seqq., 215. 
151
  If a certain head of damage can occur only once and can therefore be attributed only alternatively or in part, 
but not cumulatively, to the different levels of the production chain, it can be claimed only by one level of the 
production chain, while others claims are excluded, cf. BGH, case KZR 75/10, Selbstdurchschreibepapier 
(“ORWI“), NJW 2012, 928, 933, paras 60, 
152
 Potential purchasers have to prove that they had bought (more) from the cartel members, which will often be 
very difficult and is even deemed highly speculative, see Wils, 26 World Comp 473, 487 (2003); Crane, in: 
Hylton (fn. 40), p. 1, 15. A successful claim might be possible if the affected buyer was in a stable customer-
client relationship with the cartel members. 
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effects.
153
 From a law and economics perspective, one might therefore advocate accepting 
only the direct quantity effect, not the price effect, as a component of suppliers’ damages.154 
However, there are at least two important counter-arguments: First, in view of the fact that 
cartels cause ripples of harm to flow through the economy, it is not to be expected that all 
those who suffer from welfare losses actually claim damages. It would therefore not appear 
convincing to restrict the legal notion of damages for those that are sufficiently proximate to 
the cartel and thereby good positioned to make a claim for efficiency reasons. Second, 
sticking to the traditional legal notion of damages would increase legal certainty for supplier 
claims and fit well with the ECJ case law that attaches also a preventive purpose to 
competition law actions for damages. 
b) The goal of competition law: Consumer welfare vs. supplier losses? 
The argument of supplier damages being merely reflective could at most have some force 
from a normative perspective if one considers consumer welfare to be the primary goal of 
European community competition law and – based on this – losses to upper levels of the 
production chain to be immaterial. However, such a view seems hardly tenable since the EJC 
has held in GlaxoSmithKline that Article 101 TFEU aims to protect not only the interests of 
competitors or of consumers, but also the structure of the market and, in so doing, competition 
as such.
155
 Therefore, according to the ECJ, for a finding that an agreement has an anti-
competitive object, it is not necessary that final consumers be deprived of the advantages of 
effective competition in terms of supply or price.
156
 Against this background, it cannot be 
argued that damages to upper levels of the production chain do not matter. Actually, in certain 
scenarios such as the one in GlaxoSmithKline, awarding non-consumers a right to damages 
may even be crucial for having private enforcement at all.  
c) Limited protective purpose of EU competition law? 
A more substantial counterargument is to say that, in a normative sense, suppliers of price 
cartels do not (directly) suffer from decreasing competition. The cartel restricts competition in 
the selling market to the detriment of its customers, not in the buying market. The harms to 
suppliers result from the cartel members’ efforts to minimize costs in response to a lower 
demand for their product. In the US, a similar reasoning serves to deny antitrust injury to 
suppliers.
157
 While, as shown above, the doctrine of antitrust injury cannot be readily 
transplanted into competition law regimes with less pervasive private enforcement, the legal 
                                                          
153
  See Maier-Rigaud/Schwalbe, Quantification of Antitrust Damages, Document de travail du LEM 2013-10, 
forthcoming in: Ashton/Henry, Competition Damages Actions in the EU: Law and Practice, Edward Elgar, 
2014. 
154
 Such an argument could loosely refer to Lande, 50 U of Chicago Law Rev 652 (1983), who argues that the 
optimal fine or damage award equals the net harm to others, however adjusted upward if the probability of 
detection is smaller than one. His view is often disputed especially with respect to European Competition 
law, see Wils, 29 World Competition, 183, 191 et seqq. (2006); Manzini, 31 World Competition 3 (2008). 
155
  Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited, v 
Commission, [2009] ECR I-9291, para 63; Case C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands et al., [2009] ECR I-4529, 
para 38. The protection of competition as such reflects the objective to foster and protect the economic 
intergration of the various EU member states in a common market, see on this goal Fox, in: 
Richardson/Graham, Global Competition Policy, 1997, p. 340; Whish/Bailey (fn. 2), p. 23 et seq. 
156
  GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited (fn. 155) [2009] ECR I-9291, para 63; T-Mobile Netherlands et al. (fn. 
155) [2009] ECR I-4529, para 39. 
157
  See above text accompanying fn. 55-60. 
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systems of the member states have, as explained on the example of England and Germany, 
traditionally applied exceptions if damages fall outside the protective purpose of the law 
forbidding the tortious act. However, many scholars consider this to be incompatible with the 
ECJ case law in Courage,
158
 which establishes that it is not necessary for the loss to occur in 
the same market than the lessening of competition that makes a defendant’s conduct illegal. 
While we do not think that this requires abandoning all kinds of limitations by reason of a 
protective purpose, neither Courage nor Manfredi indicate such an exception with respect to 
the right of any individual to claim damages. Instead, the ECJ defines the scope of potential 
claimants exclusively by reference to a causal link between losses and the competition law 
infringement.
159
 From a general tort law perspective, further restrictions seem indeed 
questionable because price increase and output restriction are inextricably intertwined: a price 
cartel would not be profitable if the cartel members did not adjust their input demand in view 
of falling demand for their output. Generally, a tortfeasor is liable for all damages that are 
inevitable and foreseeable effects of the tort, especially if they are brought about 
intentionally.
160
 In the European context, unlike the US, there are no reasons to privilege 
cartel members with a more restrictive standard. 
V. Estimation of supplier damages 
The preceding analysis shows that there are good reasons to conclude that cartel suppliers 
have a community law based right to damages. Regarding the exercise of that right, the case 
law in Courage and Manfredi points to national civil law with respect to the standard of proof 
and the extent of damages recoverable.
161
 The crucial challenge here is to determine the 
damages in question, which requires a sound empirical approach that enables victims to prove 
their losses and courts to sort out unfounded claims with sufficient precision. From a law and 
economics perspective, this is an essential condition for the preceding analysis to hold: Even 
if there are good arguments for a right to damages by suppliers pursuant to EU-law, this 
approach is recommendable only insofar as supplier damages can reasonably be estimated. In 
the following, we show that this is indeed possible:  
Concerning the direct quantity effect, it is necessary to estimate a specific suppliers’ decrease 
in sales volume due to the downstream cartel. This can be done by estimating a residual 
                                                          
158
 See above text accompanying fn. 74. 
159
  This interpretation of the ECJ case law is also shared by the German Federal Court, see BGH, case KZR 
75/10, Selbstdurchschreibepapier (“ORWI“), NJW 2012, 928, 931, para 35. 
160
  Pursuant to English law, damages recoverable in contract and tort are determined via two steps: First, a prima 
facie but-for test of causation (“cause in fact”), and, especially in negligence cases, a test referring to 
remoteness, proximate or effective causes (“cause in law”), that basically excludes losses that were not 
reasonably foreseeable (see Tettenborn/Wilby (fn. 57), p. p. 170 et seqq. (remoteness), p. 183 et seqq. 
(causation); McGregor on Damages, 18
th
 ed. 2009, para 6-005 et seqq.; Ogus, The Law of Damages, 1974, p. 
60 et seqq. With respect to deliberate torts and intentionally-caused damage, the latter test is arguably slightly 
relaxed in the sense that all harms directly flowing from the intentional illegal conduct are recoverable, see 
further Ogus, opt cit., p. 70 et seq.; McGregor, opt cit., para 6-014; Tettenborn/Wilby (fn. 57), p. 181 et seq. 
The US approach, already sketched in fn. 57 above, is quite similar, although the terminology partly differs. 
The same may be said with respect to German law, that has also developed two cumulative main tests: First, 
a but-for test, asking whether the defendant’s illegal conduct was a condition sine qua non for the losses 
claimed; second, the occurrence of the harm claimed must have been reasonably foreseeable according to 
general life experience (“adequate Kausalität), see further Lange/Schiemann, Schadensersatz, 3rd, ed. 2003, p. 
77 et seqq.; Grüneberg (fn. 122), Vorb § 249 paras 26 et seqq. 
161
  Bornkamm, in: Langen/Bunte (fn. 110), § 33 GWB para 41. 
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demand model for this specific supplier that takes the emergence of the cartel into account.
162
 
The residual demand function captures the demand a specific supplier faces after the reaction 
of all other supplier-firms is taken into account. Hence, the residual demand function accounts 
for the strategic interdependency between competing suppliers, i.e. the fact that a change by 
one firm prompts the other firms in the same (e.g. supplier-)market to adjust their prices as 
well. 
Assume that the demand a cartel supplier   faces in the market for its product (the input for 
the cartelized good) is given by  
                 ,         (1) 
where    is the unit price firm   charges for its product,     a vector of prices charged by all 
other suppliers-competitors,   a vector of demand shifters and   a cartel binary variable 
(dummy) measuring demand changes due to the emergence of a downstream cartel. The first 
order condition of profit maximization provides the best-reply function of firm  , 
                   ,         (2) 
where   represents a vector of industry specific cost variables and    firm specific costs of 
firm  . The best-reply function denotes the optimal output price for firm   for given prices of 
all other firms.
163
 Likewise, the vector of best-reply functions of all other firms is given as 
                     .         (3) 
Substituting vector (3) into firm  ’s demand function (1) yields the residual demand function 
for firm  : 
  
    
               .         (4) 
Note that since price and quantity of firm   are jointly determined, the residual demand 
function must be estimated with a two-stage-least-squares instrumental variable (IV-) 
estimation. A suitable instrument for    is   , because firm specific cost of firm   is generally 
correlated with    but uncorrelated with the residuals.
164
 The econometric implementation of 
the second stage of an IV-estimation of the residual demand function (4) is then given as 
follows:
165
 
    
           ̂         
      
      
                (5) 
                                                          
162
 The residual demand model was proposed by Baker and Bresnahan (1988) with the objective to estimate 
market power of firms in product differentiated industries. See Baker, J. B. and Bresnahan, T. F., Estimating 
the residual demand curve facing a single firm, International Journal of Industrial Organization 6 (1988), pp. 
283-300. We merely describe the main steps and features of this approach as presented by Motta, 
Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, 2004, p. 125, however, adjusted with respect to the existence of a 
downstream cartel. 
163
 The underlying assumption of this approach is that supplier i behaves like a Stackelberg-leader in the supplier 
market. 
164 See Motta (fn. 162), p. 127. 
165
 Note that the model is not specified as a panel but as a time series. As before, the subscripts i and –i indicate 
whether the respective variables refer to firm i or all other firms. The subscript t indicates the time dimension 
(weekly, monthly or yearly). 
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   ̂
 is the estimated price obtained from the first stage IV-estimation
166
,    a binary variable 
equal to one during the cartel period and zero otherwise, and  ,   and     vectors of 
exogenous variables that affect demand, industry specific cost variables and firm specific cost 
drivers from firms other than firm  .  
The approach used to determine the quantity effect is equivalent to the before-and-after 
method for overcharge estimations. In the present context, it compares pre- and/or post cartel 
sales to the sales of the supplier during collusion, relying on the assumption that the 
competitive situation in the market but for the cartel would have evolved similar to the 
situation before and/or after collusion. The estimation therefore requires data of the respective 
variables from the cartel period as well as the non-cartel period.
167
 
The average output reduction incurred by the cartel supplier per period during cartelization is 
now given by the estimated coefficient   ̂, and the harm associated with the quantity effect 
(as described in section II 2) amounts to 
[∑   ̂  
 
   ]  
     .          (6) 
The first term sums up the output decreases over the entire cartel period, and is then 
multiplied by the price-cost margin earned by the cartel supplier in the counterfactual 
competitive scenario.  
The price-cost margin can be estimated by means of supplier  ’s residual demand elasticity, as 
we will show during the following analysis of the remaining determinants of a supplier’s 
overall damage, the price and cost effect.
168
 These effects shown in Table 1 (section II 2, p.6) 
are given by  
 ̃    
   ̃   ̃    
   ̃ , 
which can be rewritten as 
           ̃   ̃   ̃  .        (7) 
Expression (7) corresponds to the difference between the supplier’s price-cost margin under 
competition and under collusion, multiplied by the quantity sold to the cartel members during 
collusion. To quantify the price and cost effect, it is therefore necessary to estimate the price-
cost margin of the supplier for both regimes. This can be done by means of firm  ’s Lerner 
Index of market power, given as 
   
     
  
  
 
  
 , 
where   
  denotes the residual demand elasticity faced by supplier   in the supplier market. 
The Lerner Index relates the firm’s mark-up (price minus marginal costs) to the price charged 
by the firm. In case of perfect competition in the supply market, the Lerner Index is zero, 
                                                          
166
 In the first stage of the two-stage-least-squares IV estimation    is regressed on    as well as all other right-
hand side variables included in the second stage. Although not specified here, the first stage regression results 
also constitute a test for whether    is correlated with   , i.e. whether    can be used as instrument for   . For 
a detailed description of instrumental variable estimation, see Wooldridge, J. M., Introductory Econometrics: 
A Modern Approach. Second Edition, 2003, Thomson South-Western. 
167 
For a more detailed description of the before-and-after approach as well as other econometric methods for 
estimating cartel overcharges, see, e.g., Davis/Garcés, Quantitative Techniques for Competition and Antitrust 
Analysis, 2010, pp. 347-380. 
168
 Alternatively, the price-cost margin could also be determined with the help of accounting data. 
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suggesting that no price and cost effects occur. With increasing market power the Lerner 
Index increases up to the theoretical maximum value of 1 under monopolization.  
We can derive the residual demand elasticities for both periods of time (collusion and non-
collusion) by estimating a slightly different version of the residual demand model described 
above (equation (5)):
169
 
       
              ̂                ̂     
      
      
             (8) 
The only difference to model (5) is that both quantity and instrumented price of the supplier 
are in logarithm and that an additional interaction term between instrumented price and cartel-
time dummy      
   ̂
    is included. The residual elasticity of demand during and outside the 
cartel period for supplier   is now given as 
  
  
        
 
        
̂
         , with    {
                                       
                                
 
The estimated demand elasticities in the cartel and the non-cartel period combined with price 
data of the cartel supplier make it possible to calculate price-cost margins, which can then be 
used to jointly calculate the price and cost effect as defined in expression (7).
170
 The estimated 
price-cost margin during the competitive period additionally complete the calculation of the 
direct quantity effect as stated in (6). 
In principle, the approach described in this section could also be applied to a group of firms, 
for instance a group of (supplier-) claimants. One then would have to treat this group as one 
single firm in the market and estimate the residual demand for the entire group. However, 
such an approach is subject to at least one important disadvantage: Unlike purchasers who are 
generally exposed to the same price effect, cartel suppliers might encounter substantially 
different quantity effects. To illustrate, assume that the cartel members decrease their input 
demand by 10 percent due to the infringement. They might then either reduce their input 
demand equally by 10 percent with respect to each supplier, or cut demand to a greater extent 
or even to quit the business relationship with respect to certain suppliers only. In an extreme 
case, this might even entail a larger input demand from other suppliers in order to receive bulk 
discounts. Hence, unlike in the case of an average overcharge, it is critical to suppose that a 
general decrease in residual demand of 10 percent harms all suppliers equally by a 10 percent 
reduction in sales. If this assumption is not warranted, separate estimations for each supplier 
are preferable. 
VI. Conclusion 
Private enforcement of competition law is on the rise worldwide and has been on top of the 
agenda of European competition policy for almost one and a half decades now. However, 
while actions for damages by cartel customers have received much attention, the numerous 
other parties that may incur losses due to a cartel are usually neglected. In particular, suppliers 
to a downstream price cartel have mostly been overlooked so far. Such suppliers incur losses 
                                                          
169 Again, model (8) reflects the second stage of a two-stage-least-squares estimation. For information on the first 
stage regression, see footnote 161. 
170 
It is worth mentioning that the price-cost margins of cartel and non-cartel period might not be significantly 
different, especially when the quantities sold by the supplier to cartel firms merely represent a small fraction 
of his total output or when the degree of competition in the supplier market is high. In such cases one should 
rather abstract from price and cost effects and primarily concentrate on the direct quantity effect. 
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subject to three effects: Cartel members lower sales and correspondingly their input demand 
(direct quantity effect), which in turn affects the price suppliers can charge for their product 
(price effect) and their production costs (cost effect).  
Whether suppliers are legally entitled to damages for such losses is however far from self-
evident. While the EU and the US both seem to generously grant damages to “any individual” 
or “any person” harmed by a cartel, the standards on supplier standing actually diverge: In the 
US, although a clear and consistent body of case law on supplier standing is missing, the 
majority view currently denies standing. By contrast, the emerging position in the EU is to 
grant suppliers a right to damages. In particular, if follows from the case law in Courage v. 
Crehan that in the EU, unlike in the US, a right to damages caused by a competition law 
infringement does not require the loss to occur in the same market than the lessening of 
competition that makes the defendant’s conduct illegal. The type of loss which the 
competition provisions are intended to prevent is therefore broader in the EU than in the US, 
although many details are still open. This affects the laws of the EU member states that, 
subject to the EU-law principles of equivalence and effectiveness, currently govern action for 
damages. Indeed, both Germany and England have abandoned important traditional 
limitations on standing in order to comply with the ECJ case law.  
We argue that a more liberal approach to standing in the EU compared to the US can be 
justified in view of the different institutional context and the goals assigned to the right to 
damages in the EU. Based on this view, cartel suppliers in principle have a right to damages, 
as no general restrictions on standing ought to apply; the causation requirement will be one of 
the main hurdles to clear for them. Sound econometric estimation techniques are of major 
importance to overcome this obstacle. In this respect, we show that damages of a specific 
supplier can be estimated with a residual demand model that is adjusted for the emergence of 
a downstream cartel.  
Overall, our results therefore suggest that (i) cartel suppliers in principle have standing to 
claim damages according to EU law and that (ii) it is generally possible to quantify those 
damages with sufficient precision, making supplier claims a viable option that can contribute 
to full compensation and greater cartel deterrence irrespective of further collective action 
mechanisms. 
